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ABSTRACT 
 
Bryan Schrader Hart 
 
The Role of International Actors in Post-Conflict Bosnian Elections 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. John D. Stephens) 
 
This thesis discusses the role of international actors in the post conflict elections in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It focuses mainly on the role of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 
shaping the electoral system and influencing electoral politics through conflict management 
strategies.  The main focus is placed on the entity parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2002 
in order to assess the value and success of the conflict management strategies employed as 
well as the success of the international actors themselves.  The thesis concludes that while 
international actors have been successful in producing a degree of stability in Bosnia since 
1995, they have been less successful in reducing the saliency of ethnic politics in elections 
and consequently the role of the major ethno-nationalist parties in the post-conflict political 
system. 
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SRS  Serb Radical Party 
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Introduction 
 
Ten years on from the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 and the end of 
violent conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a relatively stable example of the 
international community’s role in democratization.  The state and institutions built from the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as the 
Dayton Agreement) have to a large extent continued intact. 
With the involvement of the international community in the Bosnian conflict, the 
community committed itself to securing the stability and development of the Bosnian state.  
While this role is manifold, their role in elections is a good gauge for the over-all 
involvement of the international community in the peace and transition process in Bosnia.  
More generally, elections form a fundamental part of the international communities basic 
approach to state-building and democratization.  There are countless examples of where the 
international community has focused particularly on elections in their involvement.1  
Elections in this sense are often used as the catch-all indicator for “democratic progress” in 
transition and post-conflict societies.  Moreover, as an institutionalized means to regulate 
power sharing, they are of primary importance to ethnically divided states.  Consequently, 
“creatively crafted electoral rules hold particular promise because they structure the 
                                                 
1 This is particularly true in other place in the former Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo.  See  Andrew Taylor’s essay 
(2005) for a similar evaluation of the international community’s role in elections and democratization of a post-
conflict ethnically diverse state. 
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incentives and pay-offs available to political actors in their search for electoral victory, 
making some types of behavior more rewarding than others” (Reilly 2001: 10) 
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is no exception to this general framework.  
With the establishment of a multi-ethnic state through the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia must 
deal with the issues of being both a post-conflict state as well as an ethnically divided state.  
Elections in BiH are consequently an integral part of the post-Dayton  peace-building 
process, forming one of the main tasks of both the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and the Office of the High Representative as well as having an annex of 
the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) dedicated exclusively to it (Dayton Annex 3).  According 
to the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S. government agency in 
charge of monitoring and encouraging compliance with OSCE agreements, “continuous 
elections, if held in as free and fair a manner as possible have been viewed by the 
international community as a means to bring stability and recovery to a country divided by 
extreme nationalist political leaders” (CSCE 1998: 1).  Thus, elections have primacy in the 
international community’s effort to reduce the efficacy of ethno-nationalist politics in Bosnia.  
They are often seen as a means to establishing a normal political discourse.  That is one that 
is not centered on ethno-nationalist lines.   
Therefore, elections have been of prime importance to the international actors in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, these international actors (mainly the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Office of the High Representative) have had 
difficulty in limiting the political power of the wartime nationalist parties of the constituent 
ethnic groups.  In fact, the wartime ethno-nationalist parties have formed the majority of the 
governments in the state since its inception following the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.  
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Nevertheless, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) together with 
the Office of the high Representative (OHR) have attempted to limit the electoral success of 
ethno-nationalist parties through electoral engineering, which is largely informed by 
contemporary conflict management strategies for ethnically divided states. 
These attempts have been based on consociational and integrative conflict 
management strategies.  The post-Dayton order in Bosnia is mostly based on the first 
approach that is a consociational approach.  Here ethnic conflict is managed through power 
sharing arrangements and recognized groups rights to participate in the political process.2  
Conversely, integrative approaches seek to abate ethnic conflict by forcing elites to cooperate 
across ethnic lines.3  This cooperation is achieved (in theory) by establishing an institutional 
logic that creates rewards (electoral usually) for elites that make appeals to other ethnic 
constituencies.  Both of these approaches have been used by the international community in 
post conflict Bosnia.  While the Dayton framework, which includes the Bosnian constitution 
in Annex four, is largely a consociational design, post-Dayton strategies and election law 
have included both types of conflict management, as well as other means of direct 
intervention. 
In this thesis I plan to follow elections in Bosnia in two phases: the period from 1998-
2002, and the period after 2002.  Within the first phase I will focus on the 2000 elections and 
in the second phase I will focus on the 2002 elections.  I will primarily focus on the 
parliamentary elections in Bosnia’s two entities(i.e. the two largest political divisions 
established through Dayton), which are the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) 
and Republika Srpska (RS).  The entities, established through Dayton, are the two largest 
                                                 
2 This approach was primarily established by Arend Lijphart (1977). 
3 This approach was primarily established by Donald Horowitz (2000). 
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political units in Bosnia and have large individual competences vis a vis the federal (i.e. 
national) level government.  Moreover, 2002 acts as a useful divide in assessing the role of 
international actors on elections in Bosnia because in 2002 the OSCE took a more passive 
role with the return of the electoral commission to Bosnian control.  Before 2002, the OSCE 
as well as the OHR took a very active role in electoral legislation and design through the 
post-Dayton provisional electoral commission (PEC) that the OSCE ran.  
This thesis will more generally follow the literature on the role of international actors 
and organizations in democratization and the roll of elections in divided societies (as well as 
post conflict societies).  In order to address this question, I will first investigate the role and 
mandate of the most important international actors in BiH, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the Office and the High Representative.  From these actors, I will 
first analyze potential models and strategies for dealing with democratization in divided 
societies and then move onto how these organizations have attempted to employ these 
strategies within the existing structure of post Dayton Bosnia. 
  
 
 
 
 
International Actors and Democratization 
 
Democratization is often addressed from a domestic perspective.  However, the 
influence of external actors on democratization and domestic political change is an integral 
part of political transition in many states (Pevehaus 2002).4  Moreover, elections are an 
essential part of the international community’s concept of democracy (Carothers 2002).  
Consequently, elections have central meaning in international efforts in post-conflict and 
transition states (Reilly 2002a).   
International actors have been especially important in the case of Europe, where the 
European Union (EU) among others has striven to exert its political influence through 
conditionality and guide political change, particularly in its neighborhood (Dimitrova and 
Pridham 2002; Vachudova 2005).  This conditionality of the EU on new member states is 
largely documented and has generally been seen as successful example of the role that 
international actors can play in transition states. 
We can include Bosnia and Herzegovina in this trend to some degree because it began 
a similar process with the signing of the Stability and Association Process (SAP) in 1999 and 
the opening of negotiation for the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) in November 
                                                 
4 Pevehaus argues that this roll is under theorized.  Nevertheless, Levitsky and Way have shed light on this topic 
in their argument that democratization supported by international actors through so-called “linkages.”  This 
entails that the more linkages a state has, the more democratization pressure exerted upon them by international 
actors (Livitsky and Way 2005).  Geoffrey Pridham and Milada Vachudova argue separately that international 
actors develop conditionality in order to exert democratization leverage on transition states (Dimotrova and 
Pridham 2004; Vachudova 2005).  In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the role of conditionality is less clear 
because international actors have a clear legal mandate through the Dayton Agreement in order to implement 
the peace process.  
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of 2005.5  Moreover, the EU agreed to a stronger engagement in Bosnia during the last 
elections, which just occurred in October 2006.6 
However, the case of Bosnia is also somewhat unique because of the wide-ranging, 
general powers that the international actors have been granted.  Bosnia’s development has 
been strongly affected by the influence of international actors, beginning with the 
international intervention during the conflict.  Many organizations have participated after 
Dayton (refer to table one).  There is a general consensus that state-building in the case of 
Bosnia was a necessary international project.  The normative conditions following the 
conflict supported the mandate of international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 
2005).7  Through these powers it is possible to interpret BiH as an international protectorate. 
Indeed, the role of international actors in Bosnia is debated.  According to some 
analyses, international organizations have had a negative effect on Bosnia because they lack 
accountability and transparency (Chandler 2000; Knaus and Martin 2003; Caplan 2005).8  
The main argument of this position is that external regulation and interference delays 
democratization.  According to Chandler “the trend towards giving greater decision-making 
to international administrators can produce unintended results, undermining Bosnian 
institutions and creating relations of dependency rather than a basis for stable democratic 
self-government” (Chandler 2000: 3).  Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin argue equally that “in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, outsiders do more than participate in shaping the political agenda – 
                                                 
5 At this point there is no contractual relationship between Bosnia and the EU until the completion of the SAA 
(European Commission 2005).  However, the SAP can also be interpreted as a part of the integration process 
(Dangerfield 2004). 
6 See the Decision of the Council of the European Union on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in 
the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006).  See also OSCE (2006) preliminary findings on 
the 2006 elections. 
7 He argues that this new normative framework emerged after the cold war. 
8 The main argument of these texts is that the role of international organizations has a negative impact on 
Bosnia because they are not accountable to the people.  The debate mainly revolves around the usefulness of 
international organizations in the democratization process.  
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something that has become the norm throughout Eastern Europe, as governments aspire to 
join the European Union.  In BiH, outsiders actually set that agenda, impose it, and punish 
wish sanctions those who refuse to implement it” (Klaus and Martin 2003: 61).  This critique 
matches the role that international organizations have played in elections as well, where they 
have received many powers in elections in order to implement and realize the peace and 
democratizations process.  While elections are now in general characterized as free and fair, 
the reduction of influence from the ethno-national parties is only slim.  Because of the stated 
goal of the international community in BiH to increase interethnic political participation it is 
very difficult to assess the participation of international organizations in Bosnia as 
successful.   
Reciprocally, there are several analyses that see the international presence in Bosnia 
as both necessary and on average positive for the residents of BiH (Bose 2002).  Bose argues 
that the international participation in BiH is not an example of “liberal imperialism”, despite 
the fact that many errors were made there.  Instead, she emphasizes the peacekeeping 
measures of the international actors in BiH evidence of the positive role that the international 
community place in the democratization process.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
International Actors in BiH and their Mandate 
 
Since the end of the conflict in Bosnia, the main actors have been the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR), who also since 2005 has worked as the special representative 
(SR) of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (See table 1).  These two organizations have been especially 
important in organizing and conducting elections, as well as regulating and legislating the 
electoral system in post-conflict Bosnia.  Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic argue that 
“over time electoral regulations have been imposed with the aim of securing electoral 
outcomes favorable to the successful implementation of Dayton.  As defined by Dayton’s 
implementers, this has meant, most importantly, the formation of multi-ethnic or non-
nationalist governments at all levels” (Manning and Antic 2003: 53). 
 
The High Representative 
The High representative (HR) was installed after the conflict through the Dayton 
Agreement and is the strongest international actor / institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.9  
The HR is nominated by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which is an ad hoc 
intergovernmental Council that consists of 55 representatives from both states and 
organizations.  This nomination is additionally ratified by the United Nations Security 
Council (Bieber 2006).  The PIC supervises the OHR and sets its goals. 
                                                 
9 Indeed, the powers of the high representative are what is most often debated (Chandler 2000; Knaus and 
Martin 2003; Caplan 2005).  
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The Dayton Agreement charges the Office of the High Representative with the 
supervision of the implementation of all the civilian aspects of the peace agreement on behalf 
of the international community.  According to Dayton the OHR is “the final authority in the 
theater regarding interpretation of this agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace 
settlement” (DPA, Art IV, Annex 10).  The first mandate of the OHR included overseeing, 
coordinating and reporting on the implementation of the peace settlement (DPA, Art. II, 
Annex 10).  However, this mandate was broadened in 1997 by the Peace Implementation 
Council because the existing mandate was not seen as strong enough (Caplan 2004).  
Through this re-interpretation of the mandate, the OHR received new executive and 
legislative capabilities.  The High Representative was permitted to exercise his authority to 
issue legally binding decisions as well as to dismiss civil servants, who overstepped their 
legal duties under Dayton (PIC 1997).10   
Since 2002, the High Representative is double-hatted as the Special Representative of 
the European Union (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He was appointed by the Council 
of General Affairs and External Relations and facilitates political coordination between the 
EU and Bosnia as well as supervises the European Police Mission in BiH (EUPM). 
In regard to elections, the HR has the ability (after the Bonn Meeting) to dismiss 
candidates, who have violated the peace agreement.  He is also a member of the electoral 
commission, which was established by the OSCE.  The OHR also has the competence to 
draft new electoral laws.11 
 
                                                 
10 These new powers were labeled the “Bonn Powers” after the Bonn meeting in which the PIC decided to 
broaden the OHR’s powers.   
11 The PIC instructed the OHR to design and draft a new electoral law after the first elections.  This bill was 
finished in 1999, but was not accepted by the Bosnian parties, which had to agree to it for it to be ratified (PIC 
1997).   
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The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
The other important organization in BiH that I will deal with is the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The OSCE is recognized as a regional 
arrangement from the United Nations, which functions as an instrument for early warning, 
crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe.  The OSCE is one of many 
international organizations that are charged under the Dayton Agreement with the 
responsibility to help BiH’s transition to a stable, secure, and democratic society.  According 
to the framework of the Dayton Agreement, the OSCE was officially charged to 
1) lead free and fair elections 
2) oversee human rights  
3) ensure regional security and stability  
 
In order to complete these tasks, the OSCE established a mission in BiH (OSCE 1995).  For 
the purposes of this thesis, I will mainly discuss the role of the OSCE in regard to elections 
as that is the main theme of this work.   
Under the Dayton Agreement the OSCE was charged with conducting free and fair 
elections (DPA, Annex 3).12  The Dayton Agreement states that the OSCE is mandated “to 
certify whether elections can be effective under current social conditions in both entities and, 
if necessary, to provide assistance to the parties in creating these conditions” (DPA, Art. I, 
Annex 3).  How the OSCE should create these conditions is explained in the next article.  
The OSCE should observe the preparations for the elections on the different levels of 
governance in BiH and observe the elections themselves as well as ensure the punctuality of 
the elections.   
                                                 
12 These elections were to be conducted according to the criteria of the OSCE in the Copenhagen Document 
(paragraph 7 and 8).  The Copenhagen document is the conclusions of the second meeting o the Commission for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (the former OSCE) in 1990.  Both paragraphs deal mainly with the 
execution of elections by international actors.   
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The OSCE should also establish a provisional electoral commission (PEC) (DPA, 
Art. III, Annex 3).  This commission passes electoral reforms and regulations and consists of 
the leader of the OSCE Mission to BiH, the HR (or an appointed representative), 
representatives of the main parties in BiH, as well as other persons that the OSCE decides to 
include (DPA, Art. III, Annex 3).13  The leader of the Commission is by default the 
representative from OSCE.  He/she has the authority singly to make decisions in the electoral 
commission.  The commission should have only existed for the first elections in 1996, but the 
authority of the OSCE was extended by the PIC, when a new electoral law was unable to be 
passed (Peace Implementation Council 1997).  However, the provisional electoral 
commission was placed under Bosnian control finally in 2002.14  The new electoral 
commission was taken over by the Bosnia government and the role of the OSCE was reduced 
to observer-status.  Nevertheless, there is still cooperation between the two organizations.   
The new mandate of the OSCE now includes responsibility for human rights, security 
cooperation, education, and democratization.  The conducting of elections since 2002 has 
been reallocated as a sovereign power of the Bosnian state. 
International Actors, as it is apparent, have had a very strong role in the electoral 
process of post-conflict Bosnia.  Through the power of draft laws these organizations have 
tried to pursue a course of “institutional engineering” in order to reduce ethnic conflict 
through political institutions.  However, the success if these attempts is limited, as we will 
see (Manning and Antic 2003; Manning 2004). 
                                                 
13 This commission deals with electoral legislation over (for example) the eligibility of political parties, 
candidates, and voters, the role of domestic and international election observers, as well as the publication of 
election results.   
14 See Election Law of BiH (2002).  
  
 
 
 
 
Elections in Divided and Post-Conflict Societies 
 
Elections are very often the main focus of the international community after a conflict 
or during a political transition.  Thomas Carothers has astutely argued that elections have 
received a “determinative importance” in the democratization process (Carothers 2002: 7).15  
Benjamin Reilly observes as well that elections have become an essential part of 
peacekeeping missions (Reilly 2002a: 118).16  It seems the more that international 
peacekeeping missions have focused on the stability of a state and even the building of state, 
where one doesn’t exist, the more that elections have received a central importance in the 
approach of the international community.  Terrence Lyons notes that elections form the core 
of the “democratic reconstruction model” of the international community (Lyons 2004: 37).  
According to these views, elections are the dominant starting point of post-conflict political 
order.   
Moreover, post conflict societies are often strongly divided along linguistic, religious 
or other cleavages.  In these societies elections are even more important because they 
regulate power-sharing and power divisions (Reilly 2001; Reilly 2002b; Bieber and Wolff 
2005).  In these societies it is relatively easy for elites to play the “ethnicity card.”  This 
                                                 
15 Carothers asserts that this conviction of the international community is misplaced because “in many transition 
countries, reasonable, regular, genuine elections are held but political participation remains shallow and 
governmental accountability is weak […] It is also striking how often electoral competition does little to 
stimulate the renovation or development of political parties in many gray-zone countries” (Carothers 2002: 15).   
16 He sees five reasons for this: 1) elections are a beginning point for the new political order 2) elections can 
spark the development of democratic politics 3) elections help to select representatives 4) elections help to form 
a government 5) elections confer legitimacy (Reilly 2002a: 118).   
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danger is especially prevalent during elections, as a method to mobilize more voters.17  This 
can leads consequently to a downward spiral, where the different elites attempt to outdo the 
others with escalating rhetoric and claims.   
Before we can investigate strategies that help to minimize or reduce this downward 
spiral, we must establish a clear concept of the role of ethnicity in politics to use. The role of 
ethnic politics in the process of political change is integral and calls for further development 
of the relation between ethnicity and politics.  It is important to understand the role that 
ethnicity plays in politics in order to determine how ethnicity enables elites to maintain 
political power.  In this sense, we need to further flesh out the idea of ethnicity in order to see 
how it intersects with the political sphere.  
Scholars have generally approached ethnicity in two broad ways.  In one approach, 
they have emphasized ethnicity as a primordial concept, existing as a natural category.  The 
other approach focuses on ethnicity as a socially constructed category (this approach is 
sometimes referred to as instrumentalism).  The primordial approach has less credibility as a 
general approach, but can at times inform constructivist approaches.  James Fearon and 
David Latin contend that there are three versions of the constructivist approach; ethnicity 
constructed by discourse, ethnicity constructed by social and economic processes, and Elite 
construction of ethnicity (Fearon and Latin 2000).  These versions vary in their attempt to 
explain how ethnicity is constructed and how ethnic construction leads to violence.   
For the purposes of this paper, I will follow the approach laid out by Benjamin Reilly 
(Reilly 2001).  Reilly conceptualizes the intersection of ethnicity and politics as a mixture of 
both primordial and instrumental approaches.  According to Reilly “ethnic identity can be 
                                                 
17 V.P. Gagnon argues similarly that the ethnicity also can demobilize opposition instead of mobilizing more 
support (Gagnon 2004).   
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seen, on the one hand, as being based on ascriptive and relatively immutable factors such as 
religion, tribe, race, or language – a position often characterized in the scholarly literature as 
‘primordialism’ – and, on the other hand, as being a more malleable function of constructed 
social identities formed by colonialism and by post colonial developments” (Reilly 2001: 4).  
Thus, he sees the politicization of ethnic identity as the result of instrumentalization of elites 
of existing ethnic categories.  In this sense, ethnic identity is in many ways an elite 
construction, or at least insofar as it enters the political sphere.18 
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not deviate from this intersection of ethnicity and 
politics.  As a deeply divided society, ethnic identity still plays an important role in political 
alignment.  The main division runs across religious lines, but as Greenberg (2005) has 
argued, linguistic differences have also been instrumentalized to define ethnicity.  The main 
ethnic groups are the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.  The Bosnians are historically Muslim, 
while the Serbs are historically Eastern Orthodox, and while the Croats are historically 
Catholic.  The three dominant ethnic groups have corresponding parties: Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS) (see table 3 for a rough sketch of party alignments).  These parties 
are still the strongest parties in Bosnia (with respect to geography).  The party system in 
Bosnia does not fit a classical left-right conflict structure (Pugh and Cobble 2001).  Instead, 
one must classify and order the parties through ethnicity and the degree of nationalism in 
order to produce an accurate map of the Bosnian party system (See table 5).  Manning argues 
                                                 
18 This approach is also pursued by Milada Vachudova.  She sees ethnicity as a construction of elites, who use it 
to mobilize support for themselves and principally their illiberal democratic regimes (Vachudova 2005).  
Greenberg sketches a similar phenomenon in his study of language and ethnic identity in the Balkans.  He 
contends that language is instrumentalized, in order to define ethnicity (Greenberg 2004).   
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that the continued dominance of ethnic cleavages points to their “embeddedness” within the 
competition structure and party system (Manning 2004).19   
Bosnia is historically a very heterogeneous region (see map 1).  However, after the 
conflict there was a general consolidation of ethnicity in the two entities through attempts at 
ethnic cleansing during the conflict.  Bosniaks and Croats are generally located in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Entity (FBiH) and Serbs are generally located in the 
Republika Sprska entity (RS) (see map 2 and table 2). 
There is a large literature concerning democracy in divided societies.  However, we 
can distinguish two main approaches within this body of work.  These are namely: 
consociational and integrative (also known as centripetal) conflict management strategies.20  
Both approaches are dependent on interethnic elite cooperation and the agreement of the 
elites to govern inclusively instead of exclusively.  The consociational approach is grounded 
on an explicit recognition of ethnic identity and consists of a focus on community rights.  
The theory presumes that a successful government is only possible when the institutions 
themselves recognize ethnic identities.  This approach normally uses proportional electoral 
systems in order to secure representation for every group.  The approach also uses quotas to 
secure representation within the proportional system.  Consociational democracy tends to 
create stability at the cost of an institutionalization of ethnic difference (Caspersen 2004). 
The other approach, integrative, attempts to overcome ethnic division in the society.  
Horowitz, the main author in this approach, criticizes consociational models because he 
                                                 
19 The argument here is that ethnic cleavages function in the same way as social cleavages defined by Lispet and 
Rokkan  (1967), by structuring the party system.  Donald Horrowitz (2001) also argues that ethnic cleavages 
can structure ethnic party systems. 
20 Arend Lijphart is the best known author in the consociational tradition and Timothy Sisk, Donald Horrowitz, 
and Benjamin Reilly are all well known authors in the integrative tradition (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1996; Horrowitz 
2000; Reilly 2001). 
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believes they institutionalize ethnic divisions (Horrowitz 2000).  His approach attempts, 
instead, to establish institutions that create incentives for elites to cooperate.  This approach 
normally uses preferential voting systems (Casperesen 2004).  In a preferential voting system 
the voters must rank the candidates according to preferences.  When the votes are counted, 
the votes for the highest ranked candidate on each ballot are counted.  However, if these 
votes do not achieve an absolute majority, the candidate that received the least amount of 
votes is left out, and the ballots are recounted using the second vote of the ballots, where the 
first vote was given to the left-out candidate.  This is repeated until an absolute majority for a 
single candidate is achieved.  In this system it is theorized that candidates need to make 
appeals to voters outside their ethnic group.  These appeals, consequently, should lead to the 
creation intra-ethnic parties or conflict lines.  This approach, however, functions better when 
ethnicity is not territorialized because elites are forced to make intra-ethnic connections and 
therefore must seek support from other ethnic groups.  Theoretically, then, this approach has 
the potential to overcome ethnic divisions through institutional engineering.   
  
 
 
 
 
Institutional Logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is normally described as a consociational democracy (Bose 
2005).  The political framework (based on the Dayton Accord) is to a large degree oriented 
towards the consociational model.  However, there are also elements of an integrative 
approach within the framework, and these seem to be growing as the Dayton framework is 
amended (Belloni 2004; Caspersen 2004; Bieber 2006).  The constitution, which is in the 
fourth Annex of the DPA, has many consociational elements.21  The central state consists of 
a two chamber parliament and a president.  The president actually consists of three officials, 
each representing their respective ethnic group.  The first chamber of the parliament is the 
“House of Representatives” and is elected from the two entities, a third of the representatives 
come from RS and two thirds come from the FBiH.  The second chamber is called the 
“House of Peoples.”  This chamber consists of 15 representatives, who are selected by the 
entity parliaments.22  Consequently, the representation of the major ethnic groups is secured 
within the institutional framework of BiH.  However, the decentralization of much of the 
powers of the central state to the entities (or even the cantons) where ethnicity is relatively 
homogenous has created a stable, but weak state-level government.  The Bosnian 
                                                 
21 These are mainly: the common institutions between the ethnic groups (the three person presidency, council of 
ministers, and two chamber parliament), ethnic autonomy (two relatively homogenous entities and within the 
FBiH relatively homogenous Cantons), power sharing and veto rights (Caspersen 2004). 
22 This body uses the same proportion between the two entities as the first chamber (1/3 for RS and 2/3 for 
FBiH) 
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government, as an institution, has relatively narrow powers and must contend with many veto 
players.23 
BiH is divided into two entities: Republika Sprska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (FBiH).  Both entities have their own parliaments.  The entities’ competences 
include everything that is not under the jurisdiction of the central government.  
Consequently, the entities have a wide scope of powers and competencies.  The FBiH is 
further divided into municipalities and cantons.  Power in this system is consequently located 
on the most ethnically homogenous levels.  In the RS this is the entity level, and the FBiH 
this is often at the canton or municipal level.  This division accounts for the large degree of 
ethnic autonomy in the consociational approach. 
Elections in this system are highly complex, because there is a large number of a 
different institution that must be elected.  Moreover, there are different rules depending on 
each institution as to how the members are elected.  For the purposes of this paper, I will 
mainly deal with the parliamentary elections in each of the entities. 
 
                                                 
23 The central state has competencies in foreign policy and relations, trade policy, monetary policy, inter-entity 
transportation, air traffic control, refugees, and the finance of the institutions (Bieber 2006: 46-47).  A new 
constitution was drafted that attempted to give more powers to the central state, in an attempt to ease the burdon 
of EU accession negotiations.  However, this new constitution failed in to gain support in the House of 
Representatives  in April of 2006 (Skrbic and Vogel 2006). 
  
 
 
 
 
Post-conflict Elections in BiH 
 
After the end of the conflict, the OSCE, as I have detailed, was given a mandate to 
conduct elections in BiH (DPA, Annex 3).  The first elections took place in 1996, only nine 
months after the end of the conflict and were conducted under the guide of the OSCE led 
Provisional Election Committee (PEC).  According to Dayton, these elections were to be 
conducted six to nine months after its coming into force. 
The PEC was established as the primary governing body for electoral regulation and 
tasked with conducting the first elections.  The PEC consisted of a representative of the 
OSCE’s mission to BiH, an appointed representative of the OHR, and representatives of the 
three main parties in BiH (HDZ, SDA, SDS).24  The Commission was in charge of 
registration of political parties, establishing eligibility of voters and candidates, establishing 
the role of domestic and international observers, as well as supervising the whole process of 
the elections, among other tasks (ICG 1996). 
Prior to the elections, a focus was placed on refugee return as a means to re-establish 
pre-conflict heterogeneity and to protect against a single ethnic group dominating a given 
area.  Consequently, the OSCE attempted through the PEC to hinder the territorialization of 
ethnicity at the time by mandating that citizens should vote in their pre-1991 constituency 
and when they were unable to do so, they must register with the PEC in their new 
constituency.  This followed the general guidelines established by the Dayton Agreement, 
                                                 
24 This composition was slightly changed in 1998 to include members of non-ruling parties as well as some civil 
society actors. 
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which stipulated “a citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she resided 
in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote in person or by absentee ballot, in that 
municipality” (DPA, Annex 3).  Accordingly, refugee return was linked to election 
participation, in the hope that it would aid moderation. 
Then OSCE chairman Flavio Cotti warned that if more work was not done to ensure a 
certain minimal standards, then the vote might lead to further entrenchment of the nationalist 
parties and “pseudo-democratic legitimization of extreme nationalist power structures” 
(OSCE 1996).  Nevertheless, the elections went ahead, as to remain within the time-frame 
established by Dayton.  The elections were won by the ethnic national parties (see table 4 for 
the election results)  Accordingly, this result legitimized the wartime ethno-national parties 
and lead to a consolidation of power between these parties (Shoup 1996; Manning 2004).   
While the OSCE found that the elections did not completely satisfy all of the criteria 
for being free and fair, they went ahead and certified the results (ICG 1996).  Election fraud 
was prevalent – there was even an election turnout of 105 percent (Manning 2004).  The 
ethno-national parties defrauded the result and encouraged voters to stay in their post-conflict 
constituencies in order to preserve the de facto ethnic cleansing that was achieved after the 
conflict.  In fact, there was only minimal refugee return (Bieber 2006).  The international 
efforts to conduct the elections in Bosnia were in many ways then unsuccessful.  Because of 
the lack of unity over a new permanent election law, the mandate of the OSCE was extended 
indefinitely by the PIC after 1996 elections. 
Even though the elections in 1996 and 1998 legitimized the ethno-national wartime 
parties, they also created a degree of stability.  This stability is largely due to the success of 
the consociational framework established by Dayton (Caspersen 2004).  While this 
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framework failed to create intra-ethnic cooperation, it did lead to relative stability in a post-
conflict society. 
 
2000 Entity Elections 
The 2000 elections continued much as the previous ones (1996 and 1998) under the 
authority of the OSCE and the Provisional Election Commission (PEC).  This mandate was 
extended by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) because of the lack of progress in 
forming a new electoral commission under the guise of the Bosnian State.25  The PIC also 
included the OHR as a main player in the upcoming elections, stating that “the High 
Representative and the OSCE Head of Mission to ensure that all parties, candidates and 
officials are in full conformity with provisions of the Peace Agreement and OSCE rules and 
regulations” (PIC 2000).  Additionally, the extended powers of the OHR (the so-called Bonn 
Powers) were also active in the upcoming elections.  Thus, the OHR had the right to dismiss 
candidates as well as elected officials who openly opposed the peace process.  The perceived 
lack of success of the international community in the first two post-conflict elections in BiH 
(1996 and 1998) led to a more active role in the next elections (Manning and Antic 2003).  
Accordingly, the stage was set for increased intervention of the part of the international 
actors. 
This intervention mainly took the form in drafting and passing a new electoral law 
before the 2000 elections.  Before the 2000 elections the HR and OSCE passed a new 
electoral law (Belloni 2004).  The OSCE and HR agreed on five large reforms in the PEC: 
1) Open party lists 
                                                 
25The council concluded in its meeting that the elections should continue in November of 2000 as planned, but 
under the OSCE.  It also stipulated that the OSCE should make changes to the election law before the upcoming 
elections (PIC 2000). 
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2) Multimember Constituencies (MMC) 
3) Compensatory seats 
4) Preferential voting system for RS president  
5) New rules for FBiH House of peoples (Barry rule) 
 
The OSCE took on open party lists because they were seen as a method to link candidates to 
their constituency.  Previously, BiH used closed party lists.  This entails that voters only vote 
for a party and consequently the party decides who was elected in each constituency.  In open 
party lists the voters are able to vote for both the candidate and the party.  This method was 
supposed to increase the responsibility of the candidate to his/her constituency (Belloni 
2004).26 
The OSCE also created MMCs for the entity parliament elections.  This entailed that 
the entities were divided into smaller constituencies for the parliament elections.  This effort 
was supposed to also increase the responsibility of the candidate to the constituency (Bieber 
2006).27  The new MMCs created clear ethnic majorities in the constituencies.  Consequently, 
it was unlikely that a candidate would receive support from other ethnic groups.   
The OSCE created compensatory seats for parties that did not overcome the minimum 
threshold.  This led to a larger fragmentation of the parliament, because more parties were 
able to enter.  The OSCE attempted, as well, to increase the return of refugees to their pre-
conflict constituencies. 
The last two measures are integrative electoral strategies.  I will not discuss the 
preferential voting system, as it does not pertain to the parliamentary elections in the entities.  
The new rules change the method for electing the House of the Peoples in the FBiH and 
                                                 
26 Bieber cites an OSCE report, which argues that open party lists place “more decision making power in the 
hands of the voters, and ensures that elected officials are more accountable to those who elect them” (Bieber 
2006: 94). 
27 Bieber cites another OSCE  report which says that MMCs increase responsibility because it is “easier for 
citizens to know who is responsible for representing them and their interests, thereby increasing the incentive 
for elected representatives to be responsive to the needs of the voters” (Cited in Bieber 2006: 95). 
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came to be known as the Barry-rule because it was strongly championed by then OSCE 
Ambassador Robert Barry.  Under the previous rule members of the House of Peoples in the 
FBiH were elected by the cantonal assemblies.  However, each national group was permitted 
to select its own representative.  Accordingly, Bosniaks were not able to vote for Croat 
representatives and vice versa.  The new rule changes this, allowing for all members of the 
assemblies to vote on the representatives to the House of Peoples.  Additionally, quotas were 
put in place to maintain the distribution and prevent under or over representation.  The 
intended purpose of such a measure is to increase moderation within the elected officials.  
The assumption is that when candidates are elected by the entire body, then they must make 
more moderate claims in order to appeal to voters that are not from their ethnic constituency.  
Accordingly, Croat candidates would have to appeal more to Bosnian voters in the Canton 
assemblies in order to be elected to the House of Peoples and vice versa. 
This change the election rules in rules shortly before the upcoming elections angered 
the Croat leadership within the HDZ and they claimed that the rule-change was a deliberate 
attempt to marginalize them within the government (Belloni 2004).  They especially 
perceived the rule change regarding the House of Peoples as an attempt to marginalize the 
Croatian voice in the government.  This rule change helped to mobilize Croatian voters, who 
already had low turnouts in the last municipal elections and were threatening to repeat in the 
upcoming elections (ICG 2000).   
The rule changes sparked a refusal by the HDZ to cooperate with International actors, 
when the HDZ refused the mandatory OSCE audit.  The HDZ was further sanctioned by the 
Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), a sub-commission of the Provisional Election 
Commission, for non-compliance with the standards on campaign slogans and materials.  The 
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EASC found the slogan “Determination or Extermination” was found to incite ethnic hatred 
and that they used imagery in television spots that was also inappropriate (OSCE 2000).  The 
Commission also struck several candidates from the HDZ party lists because they expressed 
anti-Dayton views (IGC 2000).  The HDZ exploited these measures as well in order to point 
to a bias against Croat interests in BiH by international actors and used this to mobilize 
potential voters by playing on their fears.   
Despite this growing radicalization of the Croat voters, many international observers 
held out hope for the upcoming election as an opportunity to end the rule of the nationalist 
parties.  This hope was mainly based on polls that indicated that the Social Democrat Party 
(SDP), the moderate non-nationalist party left over from the former communist party, had 
gained much ground against the SDA among Bosniak voters (ICG 2000).  
The SDA, the main war-time Bosniak nationalist party, had recently lost ground in 
the municipal elections and seemed destined to lose more ground in the upcoming entity and 
state elections.  Moreover, the anti-corruption campaigning of the OSCE along with the 
leading Sarajevo Newspaper, Dnevni Avaz had damaged the reputation of the party, showing 
how “it’s misuse of funds and corrupt practices, bore significant responsibility for the poor 
economy, non-payment of pensions, lack of assistance for war invalids, the squandering of 
international assistance and the abuse of the privatization process, all to the detriment of 
ordinary Bosnians” (ICG 2000).   
Another reason for optimism among the international community was the perceived 
threat to traditional SDA voter pool from the break away moderate Party for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (SBiH).  Previously, after splitting from the SDA the SBiH has been a willing 
coalition partner, however, in the latest municipal elections, the SBiH had distanced itself 
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from the SDA and appeared willing to seek other coalition partners.  While the SBiH is not a 
non-nationalist party like the SDP, they did have a much more moderate reputation and were 
seen by the international community as a means of advancing moderate voices.  The party 
itself campaigned in favor of Dayton and the institutions that it created (IGC 2000).  The 
party leadership, under war-time Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Silajdzic accordingly set itself to be the “king-maker” of the election.  Moreover, the party 
experienced significant pressures from international actors to form a coalition with the SDP 
(IGC 2000). 
The international community also held hopes, although slightly smaller, that positive 
changes would occur in the Republika Srpska (RS) as well in the upcoming entity elections.  
It was hoped that voters would turn away from the hard-line nationalist party, the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS).  The main two parties looked to by the international community to 
step in were the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Party of Democratic 
Progress (PDP), both relatively centrist Serbian parties. 
In the run-up to the elections there was a growing thought that the OSCE would ban 
the SDS from the elections based on their open opposition of the Dayton Agreement and the 
continued control over the party by suspected war criminal Radovan Karadzic (ICG 2000).  
Both the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. at the time, Richard Holbrooke, and the International 
Crisis Group, an important policy institute, advocated the ban of the SDS in the run up to the 
elections (Bieber 2006).  
However, the OSCE claimed that it did not want to disenfranchise a large segment of 
the RS population, which would have voted for the SDS.  Such a move would have an even 
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greater affect since the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) had already been banned in 1999.  
Consequently, the SDS was allowed to run candidates in the elections.  
The 2000 elections were the first time that non-nationalist parties were able to create 
a coalition excluding the main nationalist parties (e.g. SDA, SDS, and HDZ).  The so-called 
“Alliance for Change” won on most levels of government, which was a coalition of several 
of non-nationalist parties, including the SDP, as well as moderate nationalist parties SBiH 
and NHI (see tables 6 and 7).  At the entity level a similar coalition was formed in FBiH, 
while a coalition excluding the SDS was only nominally possible in the RS.  As can be seen 
in tables six and seven, the results of the oppositional parties clearly increased.  However, 
this result is more likely evidence of the active support given to the oppositional parties by 
the OSCE (Bieber 2006; Belloni 2004).  Moreover, the support for the ethno-national parties 
remained relatively high and only the SDA had clear losses from previous years. 
The reforms (open party lists, MMCs, and compensatory seats) did not encourage 
voting across ethnic lines.  Belloni argues that open party lists do not advance multi-ethnic 
parties because the voters have no incentive to vote for other a party of a different ethnic 
group (Belloni 2004).  Moreover, it is very difficult to encourage this sort of behavior is a 
largely consociational regime.  Belloni argues that “without altering the consociational 
structure of BiH institutions, any positive effects of electoral engineering can only occur 
under the most unusual and unpredictable circumstances” (Belloni 2005: 340).  The relative 
homogeneity of the entities blocked the need for candidates to appeal to other ethnic groups 
for support because they only need to appeal to their own to be elected. 
In the Federation the SBiH ended up as the king maker in the entity parliament 
elections, being in the position to choose between coalition with the SDA or the SDP.  After 
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significant international pressure, the SBiH agreed to help form a coalition with the SDP.  
However, due to the absence of a clear winner, the coalition had to include many of the other 
small parties in the House.     
In the Republika Srpska, the SDS emerged as the party with the largest number seats.  
However, the PDP was able, under the strong pressure from international actors, to form a 
government not included the SDS.28  The government required the passive support of the 
SDS in exchange for increased posts and influence at the lower levels of administration.   
 
2002 Entity Elections 
 Following the 2000 elections the OHR and OSCE focused on completing a permanent 
election law for BiH, which was adopted in 2001 (Belloni 2004).  This law included a 
transfer of the authority for the PEC from the OSCE to the Bosnian state, which retained a 
position within in the commission, but was reduced to observer status and has merely an 
advisory role.  The new body was renamed the Central Election Commission (CEC).  The 
elections were consequently the first since the conflict to be conducted under Bosnian 
control. 
 The new election law made several changes in the existing election rules in BiH.  
First, it increased the mandate of elected officials to fours years.  Previously, the OSCE, 
through the PEC, could dictate the term lengths after each election (IGC 2003).  Second, it 
extended the preferential voting system used for the RS presidency to the federal level 
presidency.  However, the extension was limited because it maintained the electoral basis.  
Voters in FBiH voted on the Croat and Bosniak presidents, while voters from RS voted for 
the Serb candidate (Belloni 2006).  Third, the new election law proscribed that illegal 
                                                 
28 The exclusion of the SDS was imposed by the OHR on the PDP (Bieber 2006). 
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occupants of property are only allowed to vote in their pre-war residency (Belloni 2004).  
The other changes were largely the incorporation of the previous election law written by the 
OSCE into the new national law.   
 The involvement in this election of the international community was consequently 
much more subdued.  While the OHR, OSCE, EU, and the U.S. all made their preference 
known for the non-nationalist candidates, there was far less direct intervention as there had 
been in the previous elections.  The OHR did provide direct support to the coalition by 
providing them with an economic program to campaign with (ICG 2003).  The OHR also 
mounted a “get out the vote” campaign to help counteract some of the early predictions that 
there would be a low voter turnout.29  Other international actors either made visits or made 
public statements regarding their support for the current coalition in the elections, including 
EU foreign policy special representative Javier Solana and the new U.S. secretary of State 
Colin Powell. 
 Nevertheless, the polls indicated that the nationalist powers would be the main 
winners of the election.  This is perhaps partially due to the inability of the parties from the 
“Alliance for Change” coalition to run on a common platform in the 2002 elections, 
preferring instead to run independently (Burwitz 2004).   
 The result of the 2002 elections was the removal of the short lived alliance for change 
from power and consequently the re-capturing of the government by the ethno-national 
parties (Burowitz 2004) (see table 6 and 7).  The SDP was the largest loser in these elections, 
while the results of the other parties remained more or less the same.  Burrowitz surmises 
that most the SDP voters abstained.  As proof for this, participation was markedly less as in 
previous elections.  Nevertheless, the elections were conducted however without any 
                                                 
29 The national democracy institute of the U.S. predicted that turnout would be below 40 percent (ICG 2003). 
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problems (Freedom House 2005).  This points to the stabilization of the system, even after 
subtracting direct international participation, even though the OSCE and HR still maintained 
a high presence during the elections as observers.  Moreover the elections were marked by a 
lower turnout, around 57 percent.  The provision of compensatory seats and use of 
proportional representation caused more fragmentation without diluting the support of the 
main nationalist parties (Belloni 2006).  Instead, establishing a viable opposition became next 
to impossible with the proliferation of small oppositional parties in the parliaments. 
The main nationalist parties formed a coalition at the national level, and at the entity 
level the HDZ, SDA, and SBiH went back their traditional coalition, while the PDP, SDS, 
and SDA formed a coalition in the RS (IGC 2003).  While a non-nationalist government was 
numerically possible in both entities, it was impeded by various difficulties.  In FBiH it 
would have been necessary to have the support of every single party in the house in order to 
exclude both the SDA and HDZ – no small task.  In RS, the results were much more 
manageable (surprisingly) for a moderate government to be established.  However, existing 
rivalry between the leadership of the SNSD and PDP prevented any such coalition from 
occurring (ICG 2003).  Consequently, the PDP acted again as king maker and formed a 
coalition with the SDS and the SDA, who received only a few appointments in the 
government.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As we have seen, international actors have had a quite active presence in Bosnia since 
the end of the conflict.  With the signing of Dayton, a legal and institutionalized entry point 
was created for many international organizations to participate in and influence Bosnian 
politics and society at many different levels.  Potentially one of the largest of these entry 
points has been the mandate that the OSCE and OHR have received in conducting and 
directing post-war elections in Bosnia. Elections form an important part of the international 
community’s program in post-conflict Bosnia, as they manage the distribution of power.  
Consequently, the rules for distributing this power are extremely important in a post-conflict 
and ethnically divided society.  Elections, then, were poised to be one of the principle 
conflict management techniques of the international community, as well as an indicator of 
overall democratic progress.  
 Initially, the OSCE and the OHR were fully able to participate in the drafting and 
later the revision of Bosnian election law. Through this power, they were given the 
opportunity to put their conflict management strategies into institutional practice.  Moreover, 
these actors held sway over the conducting of the elections and were initially had the right to 
remove candidates and to approve the election results. 
However, the international efforts in BiH have only been partially successful because 
they have largely consisted of ad hoc measures.  Theses measures often resulted in a mixed 
logic, where the consociational structures worked against the integrative measures being 
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pursued.  The OSCE and HR have pursued both integrative and consociational conflict 
management strategies within a deeply consociational system.  These competing logics fail to 
ameliorate the ethnic divides.  Moreover, the consociational design has largely territorialized 
and institutionalized ethnicity, creating further problems in achieving the stated goal of 
reducing the saliency of the ethnic cleavage. The lack of refugee return exacerbates this issue 
even more, by solidifying the conflict era ethnic cleansing.  Ad hoc responses and unilateral 
directives have also impeded the further developments by altering the institutional rewards 
and the locus of power and consequently the psychology of the parties and political actors.   
Integrationist scholars have argued that Bosnia should implement more preferential 
voting, which was adopted for the RS presidency in the 2000 elections, and used for the 
national level presidency in the most recent elections in October of 2006.  However, some 
scholars have argued that the use of preferential voting was not perfectly adapted because it 
only allowed for citizens to vote within their ethnicity and for the national level it restricted 
voters to their entities.   
Proponents of integrationist conflict management theories have also argued that 
Bosnia requires a complete restructuring for further reforms to be effective.  They criticize 
the current consociational foundation of BiH, especially the territorial ethnic division that 
became enshrined within the Dayton political boundaries and lack of refugee return.  Robert 
Belloni (2004) has suggested along these lines that the creation of nation wide electoral base 
for the presidency could be a first step.  While this is often criticized on the grounds that it 
gives increased influence to the largest ethnic group, the Bosniaks.  Belloni has also 
suggested that the relaxation of strict proportionality in the parliaments could alleviate some 
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of the excessive fragmentation and improve their chances of establishing an effective 
coalition. 
In measuring the success of conflict management strategies, many theorists have 
taken the absence of widespread violence as the defining criteria for success (Horrowitz 
2000).  Under this criterion it seems that Bosnia has had a fair degree of success.  BiH seems 
to have reached definite level of stability.  The perception that a new outbreak of conflict will 
occur has generally declined within the population, signally a degree of stability. However, 
the continued presence of the international community weakens the need for Bosnian 
political actors to genuinely accept the post-conflict system. Thus, anything more than this 
stability will most likely require large changes within the institutional logic as well as a 
reappraisal of the international influence and mandate in BiH.  
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1.  International Participation in BiH (After Dayton) 
Annex of 
Dayton 
Area of Authority   International Organization / 
Body 
1-A Military Aspects  NATO (IFOR, SFOR) 
1-B Regional Stabilization OSCE 
2 Inter-Entity borders  NATO (IFOR, SFOR) 
3  
Article II 
Elections 
Provisional Election Commission 
OSCE 
4 Constitution HR 
4, Article IV Constitutional Court  European Court of Human Rights 
4, Article 
VII 
Central Bank IMF 
6  
Part B 
Part C 
 
Human rights Ombudsman 
Human rights chamber 
 
OSCE 
Council of Europe 
7 Refugees   UNHCR 
8 Commission for public corporations European Bank for 
Reconstruction and development  
10 Civil Implementation  HR 
Source: (DPA 1995) 
 
Table 2.  Population Distribution 
 Federation BiH (FBiH) Republika Srpska (RS) 
 Percent Total Percent Total 
Bosniak 73 1,900,000 9.5 100,000 
Serb 7.6 200,000 80.9 850,000 
Croat 16.5 430,000 4.8 50,000 
Others 2.7 70,000 4.8 50,000 
Total  2,600,000   
Source: Bieber 2006 
 
Table 3.  Orientation of the Political Parties in BiH and their Support 
 Bosniak Serb Croat 
Extreme Nationalist -- SRS HSP 
Nationalist SDA SDS HDZ 
Moderate Nationalist SBiH SNSD, PDP NHI 
non Nationalist SDP -- -- 
cross-national -- -- -- 
Source: Bieber 2006 
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Table 4.  Results from 1996 Parliamentary Elections  FBiH 
 Seats Percent 
SDA 78 55.7 
HDZ 36 25.7 
ZL (now SDP) 11 7.9 
SBiH 10 7.1 
DNZ 3 2.1 
HSP 2 1.4 
Others 0 0 
Source: Shoup 1996 
 
Table 5.  Results from 1996 Parliamentary elections, RS 
 Seats Percent 
SDS 45 54.9 
SDA 14 17 
SPiM 10 12.2 
SRS 6 7.3 
DBP 2 2.4 
ZL (Former 
SDP) 
2 2.4 
SPAS 1 1.2 
SBiH 1 1.2 
SP-Krajina 1 1.2 
Source: Shoup 1996 
 
Table 6. Results from 2000 und 2002 Parliamentary Elections, FBiH 
 2000 2002 
 Percent  Seats (140) Percent Seats (98) 
SDA 26.8 38 32.7 32 
SDP 26.1 37 15.6 15 
HDZ 17.5 25 15.8 16 
SBiH 14.9 21 15.3 15 
BOSS 1.1 2 2.8 3 
BPS 1.7 2 1.3 1 
DNZ 2.1 3 2.3 2 
NHI 1.6 2 2 2 
Andere  10  7 
Source: Bieber 2006 
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Table 7.  Results from 2000 und 2002 Parliamentary Elections, RS 
 2000 2002 
SDS  36.1 31 31.2 26 
SNSD  13 11 21.79 19 
PDP  12.3 11 10.73 9 
SDA  7.6 6 7.1 6 
SBiH  5.2 4 3.65 4 
SDP 5.0 4 3.4 3 
SPRS 4.9 4 4.2 3 
DPS 4.1 4 0.93 1 
DNS 3.5 3 4 3 
SNS 2.3 2 0.98 1 
SRS - - 4.39 4 
Others  3  4 
Source: Bieber 2006 
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Appendix B: Maps 
 
Map 1.  Ethnic Distribution in BiH, 1991 
 
Source: CIA (1997): Opstina Zenzus.  1991.  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/ethnic_majorities_97.jpg  
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Map 2.  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Political Border after Dayton 
 
Source: UNHCR (2000): Map of the 1995 Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3ae6baea8&page=publ 
 
 38
REFERENCES 
 
Belloni, Roberto. 2004. "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia  
and Herzegovina." International Peacekeeping 11(2):334-353.  
 
Bieber, Florian. 2006. Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance. 
New York: Palgrave.  
 
Bieber, Florian and Stefan Wolff. 2005. "Introduction: Elections in Divided Societies." 
Ethnopolitics 4(4): 359-363.  
 
Bose, Sumantra. 2005. "the Bosnian State a Decade After Dayton." International 
Peacekeeping 12(3):322-335.  
 
Burowitz, Bernd. 2004. "Notes on Recent Elections: the Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina." 
Electoral Studies 23:329-338.  
 
Caplan, Richard. 2005. "Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in 
Bosnia." International Peacekeeping 12(3): 463-476.  
 
------. 2004. "International Authority and State Building: the Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina." Global Governance 10:53-65.  
 
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." Journal of Democracy 
13(1): 5-21.  
 
Caspersen, Nina. 2004. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison of Conflict-
Regulation Strategies in Postwar Bosnia." Journal of Peace Research 41(5):569-588.  
 
Chandler, David. 2005. "From Dayton to Europe." International Peacekeeping 12(3) :336-
349.  
 
------. 2000. Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto Press.  
 
Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe.  1998.  “Elections in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, September 12-13, 1998.  http://www.csce.gov.  
 
Council of European Union.  2006.  Council Decision on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and repealing 
Decision 2004/515/EC.  55/EC, 30 January.  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
umdoc=32006D0055&model=guichett  
 
Dangerfield, Martin. 2004. "Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: Stabilisation 
Device or Integration Policy?" Perspectives on European Politics and Society 5(2): 203-241.  
 
 39
Dayton Peace Agreement.  1995.  The General Framework Peace Agreement for Peace in  
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  14 December. 
http://www.ohr.int/dwnld/dwnld.html?content_id=380  
 
Dmitrova, Antoaneta and Geoffrey Pridham. 2004. "International Actors and Democracy 
Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe. The Integration Model and its Limits." 
Democratization 11(5): 91-112.  
 
Election Law of BiH.  2002.  20/2.  3 August.  http://www.oscebih.org/documents/25-eng.pdf 
 
European Commission.  2005.  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  2005 Progress Report.  COM 561, 
Final, Brussels, 9 November. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/bosnia_herzegovina/key_documents.htm 
 
Fearon, James and David Latin. 2000. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic 
Identity." International Organization 54(4): 845-877.  
 
Freedom House.  2005.  Nations in Transit 2005: Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=383&year=2005 
 
Gagnon, V.P Jr.  2004.  The Myth of Ethnic War: Croatia and Serbia in the 1990s.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Greenberg, Robert. 2004. Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its 
Disintegration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Horowitz, Donald. 2000. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: University of 
California Press.  
 
International Crisis Group (ICG).  1996.  Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  ICG Bosnia 
Report No. 16.  22 September. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1567&l=1  
 
------.  2000.  Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles.  ICG Balkans Report No. 
104.  18 December.  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1569&l=1  
 
------.  2003.  Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State 
Building.  Balkans Report No. 146.  22 July.  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1474&l=1 
 
Knaus, Gerald and Felix Martin. 2003. "Lessons from Bosnia: The Travels of the European 
Raj." Journal of Democracy 16(3):20-34. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan.  1967.  Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross 
National Perspectives.  New York: Free Press.  
 40
 
Levitsky, Steven, Lucan A. Way.  2005.  “International Linkage and Democratization.”   
Journal of Democracy 16: 20-34.  
 
Lyons, Terrence. 2004. "Post Conflict Elections and the Process of Demilitarizing Politics: 
the Role of Electoral Administration." Democratization 11(3):36-42.  
 
Manning, Carrie. 2004. "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and 
Herzegovina." Democratization 11(2):60-86.  
 
Manning, Carrie and Miljenko Antic. 2003. "Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 
Limits of Electoral Engineering." Journal of Democracy 14(3):45-59.  
 
OSCE.  2006.  International Election Observation Mission.  General Elections 2006: 
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.  Sarajevo 2 October.  
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/6465-eng.pdf  
 
------.  2000.  EASC Issue Rulings on Five Cases.  OSCE Press Releases, 31 October 2000 
 
------.  1996.  Certification of the Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Declaration of the 
Chairman-in-Office, Federal Councilor Flavio Cotti, at the Permanent Council of the OSCE, 
25 June 1996.  
 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC).  2000.  Declaration of the Peace Implementation 
Council.  Brussels, 24 May.  http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5200  
 
------.  1997.  Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997.  Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998.  
Self-sustaining Structures.  10 December. 
http://www.ohr.int/dwnld/dwnld.html?content_id=5182  
 
Pevehouse, Jon. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and 
Democratization." International Organization 56(3): 515-549.  
 
Pugh, Michael/Cobble, Margaret (2001): Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal 
Elections: Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding.  In: Journal of Peace Research 38: 
27-47. 
Reilly, Benjamin. 2002a. "Post-Conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers." International 
Peacekeeping 9(2): 118-139.  
 
------. 2002b. "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies." Journal of Democracy 13(2):156-
170.  
 
------. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict 
Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 41
Sisk, Timothy. 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.  
 
Shoup, Paul (1997): The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In: Problems of Post-
Communism 44, S. 3-16. 
 
Skrbic, Mirna and Vogel, T.K.  2006.  “Bosnia: Constitutional Reform Falters.”  Transitions 
Online.  27 April 2006.   
 
Taylor, Andrew.  2005.  “Electoral Systems and the Promotion of ‘Consociationalism’ in a 
multi-ethnic society: the Kosovo Assembly Elections of November 2001.  Electoral Studies 
24: 435-463. 
 
Vachudova, Milada. 2005. Undivided Europe: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After 
Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
 
 
 
